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COMMENTS
PINOCCHIO FOR THE DEFENSE
LINDA HARRISON GOTTLIEB
Listen, you country bumpkins, you swag-bellied yahoos, we
know how to tell many lies that pass for truth, and we know,
when we wish, to tell the truth itself.'
T HE PERJURIOUS client is a chronic problem for defense
counsel who must ethically and effectively discharge responsi-
bilities owed to a client, colleagues, the public, the court, and not
least, to self.2 The Florida Bar Code of Professional Responsibility
suggests that the duties owed to the legal system and to the client
are identical: to represent the client "zealously within the bounds
of the law."3 However, an "irreconcilable conflict" frequently oc-
curs when zealous representation leads to the proffer of false testi-
mony.4 The professional standards and rules obscure rather than
illuminate the paths available to an attorney confronted with a ly-
ing client. Authors in scholarly and professional journals lament
1. HESIoDus, THE THEOGONY line 27 (A. Athanassakis trans. 1983).
2. T. MORGAN & R. ROTUNDA, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 4 (1976).
3. FLA. BAR CODE PROF. RESP. EC 7-19.
4. Sanborn v. State, 474 So. 2d 309, 314 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985).
5. The standards usually invoked when an attorney is faced with client perjury include
the American Bar Association's (ABA) Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Standards for
Criminal Justice, and Model Code of Professional Responsibility.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(4) (1983) provides that a law-
yer shall not "[k]nowingly use perjured testimony or false evidence." DR 7-102(A)(7) pro-
hibits counseling or assisting a client "in conduct that the lawyer knows to be illegal or
fraudulent." These rules would appear to be clear and straightforward except for id. EC 7-
26 (1983) (emphasis added), which extends a lawyer's obligation to refrain from using per-
jured testimony or false evidence to include those circumstances where the attorney "knows,
or from facts within his knowledge, should know, that such testimony or evidence is false,
fraudulent, or perjured."
On the other hand, DR 4-101 states the general prohibition against a lawyer revealing the
confidences and secrets of his client, which arguably could include a client's confiding his
intent to lie on the witness stand. However, the prohibition is qualified in DR 4-101(C),
which provides that "[a] lawyer may reveal . . . [t]he intention of his client to commit a
crime and the information necessary to prevent the crime." Because perjury is a crime it
would seem to come within the qualification of this subsection. Erickson, The Perjurious
Defendant: A Proposed Solution to the Defense Lawyer's Conflicting Ethical Obligations
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this obscurity and suggest solutions that do not fully respond to
the various competing interests.8 State and federal courts also vary
in their approaches to this dilemma.
The United States Supreme Court recently set out elaborate
dicta regarding the ethical conduct of an attorney faced with a per-
jurious client.7 Justice Brennan, in his concurrence, cautioned that
"the Court cannot tell the states or the lawyers in the states how
to behave in their courts, unless and until federal rights are vio-
lated."' Yet when federal rights are at issue, the Court avoids eval-
uation of the attorney's conduct, preferring to examine the
to the Court and to His Client, 59 DEN. L.J. 75, 80 (1981). The Code does not mandate that
a lawyer reveal a client's intent to commit perjury, but only provides that a lawyer may so
reveal. Id.
To deepen the confusion, DR 7-102(B)(1) provides that:
A lawyer who receives information clearly establishing that: [h]is client has, in
the course of the representation, perpetrated a fraud upon a person or tribunal
shall promptly call upon his client to rectify the same, and if his client refuses or
is unable to do so, he shall reveal the fraud to the affected person or tribunal,
except when the information is protected as a privileged communication.
The Code does not clearly define which communications might be privileged, although DR
4-101(C)(2) allows a lawyer, whenever "permitted" under the Disciplinary Rules, to reveal
confidences or secrets.
Some confidences and secrets must be unprotected by the attorney-client privilege, or else
DR 4-101(C)(2) is mere surplusage. But the ABA Committee on Ethics and Professional
Responsibility has offered a tautological definition of the secrets and confidences that fall
outside the ambit of the "privileged communication" clause: "The balancing of the lawyer's
duty to preserve confidences and to reveal frauds is best made by interpreting the phrase
'privileged communication'. . . as referring to those confidences and secrets that are re-
quired to be preserved by DR 4-101." ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibil-
ity, Formal Op. 341 (1975).
6. The problem of the perjurious client has attracted a small army of commentatories.
See generally Erickson, supra note 5; Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View,
123 U. PA. L. REV. 1031 (1975); Freedman, Judge Frankel's Search for Truth, 123 U. PA. L.
REV. 1060 (1975); Freedman, Professional Responsibility of the Criminal Defense Lawyer:
The Three Hardest Questions, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1469 (1966); Lefstein, The Criminal De-
fendant Who Proposes Perjury: Rethinking the Defense Lawyer's Dilemma, 6 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 665 (1978); Noonan, The Purposes of Advocacy and the Limits of Confidentiality, 64
MICH. L. REV. 1485 (1966); Rieger, Client Perjury: A Proposed Resolution of the Constitu-
tional and Ethical Issues, 70 MINN. L. REV. 121 (1985); Uviller, The Advocate, the Truth,
and Judicial Hackles: A Reaction to Judge Frankel's Idea, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1067 (1975);
Wolfram, Client Perjury, 50 S. CAL. L. REV. 809 (1977); Comment, Lying Clients and Legal
Ethics: The Attorney's Unsolved Dilemma, 16 CREIGHTON L. REV. 487 (1983); Comment,
The Perjury Dilemma in an Adversary System, 82 DICK. L. REV. 545 (1978); Comment,
Perjured Alibi Testimony: The Defense Attorney's Conflicting Duties, 48 Mo. L. REV. 257
(1983); Comment, Responding to the Criminal Defense Client Who Insists on the Presen-
tation of Perjuring Nonparty Witnesses: The Schultheis Solution, 68 IowA L. REV. 359
(1983); Rotunda, Book Review, 89 HARv. L. REV. 622 (1975).
7. Nix v. Whiteside, 106 S. Ct. 988 (1986).
8. Id. at 1000 (Brennan, J., concurring) (emphasis in original).
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prejudice alleged due to counsel's behavior.9 Ultimately, each state
is left to its own devices.
Florida has chosen to address the problem of the lying client
through free narrative testimony. 10 The defendant takes the stand
and, under oath, tells his story to the court without interruption or
examination by defense counsel. In choosing this approach, Florida
has done a disservice to attorneys, judges, and jurors who partici-
pate in the judicial process and to the citizens of Florida who rely
on the outcome. In this Comment, the author details the history of
the free narrative approach and identifies its weaknesses through
an analysis of Sanborn v. State." Analysis of additional case law
demonstrates the confusion the free narrative approach has caused
in other jurisdictions as well as in the federal courts. Finally, the
author suggests an alternative approach that places a higher value
on the truth-finding aspect of the judicial process.
I. DEFENSE FUNCTION STANDARD 4-7.7
The American Bar Association (ABA) has for some years drafted
and published a series of reports that set forth standards by which
criminal justice may be better administered." At one time, the
ABA Standing Committee on Association Standards for Criminal
Justice proposed Standard 4-7.7 as part of a chapter addressing
the defense function. The Standard offered guidance to defense
counsel in dealing with client perjury in a criminal case.
Under the Standard, defense counsel was first to try to dissuade
the accused from taking the witness stand if he planned to offer
perjurious testimony. s If the accused were not dissuaded, counsel
could seek to withdraw prior to trial but he could not advise the
court of the reason for his request. 4 If the court did not allow
9. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 697 (1984). The defendant must show that
counsel's errors were so grave that defendant was deprived of a fair trial. "The benchmark
for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's conduct so undermined
the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having
produced a just result." Id. at 686.
10. See Rubin v. State, 490 So. 2d 1001 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986), cert. denied, No. 69,048
(Fla. filed Dec. 19, 1986); Sanborn v. State, 474 So. 2d 309 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985).
11. 474 So. 2d 309 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985).
12. 1 STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1986) [hereinafter cited as STANDARDS].
13. "If the defendant has admitted to defense counsel facts which establish guilt and
counsel's independent investigation established that the admissions are true but the defend-
ant insists on the right to trial, counsel must strongly discourage the defendant against tak-
ing the witness stand to testify perjuriously." Id. Standard 4-7.7(a).
14. Subsection (b) of the Standard provides:
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counsel to withdraw, and the accused took the stand and perjured
himself, counsel was not to assist in or use the perjured testimony.
Counsel was to refrain from direct examination and allow the ac-
cused to give an unassisted narrative account. Counsel was then to
ignore the accused's narrative for the remainder of the trial and
not use any aspect of the false version of facts in his closing
argument.1 s
Earlier commentary on the Standard indicated that Disciplinary
Rule (DR) 7-102(A)(7) of the ABA Model Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility (Code) implicitly approved the free narrative ap-
proach. This assertion was qualified in a later commentary in
which the Standard was said to "take into account" DR 7-
102(A)(4) and (7) by simply avoiding their violation."6 One com-
mentator has suggested that the Standard barely misses violating
the Disciplinary Rules and certainly fails to further the intent of
Ethical Consideration (EC) 7.26.17
The proposed Standard was withdrawn prior to submission of
the Defense Function chapter to the ABA House of Delegates in
February 1979. At that time, the ABA's Special Commission on
Evaluation of Professional Standards was formulating policy to ad-
If, in advance of trial, the defendant insists that he or she will take the stand to
testify perjuriously, the lawyer may withdraw from the case, if that is feasible,
seeking leave of the court if necessary, but the court should not be advised of the
lawyer's reason for seeking to do so.
Id. Standard 4-7.7(b).
15. Subsection (c) provides:
If withdrawal from the case is not feasible or is not permitted by the court, or if
the situation arises immediately preceding trial or during the trial and the defend-
ant insists upon testifying perjuriously in his or her own behalf, it is unprofes-
sional conduct for the lawyer to lend aid to the perjury or use the perjured testi-
mony. Before the defendant takes the stand in these circumstances, the lawyer
should make a record of the fact that the defendant is taking the stand against
the advice of counsel in some appropriate manner without revealing the fact to
the court. The lawyer may identify the witness as the defendant and may ask
appropriate questions of the defendant when it is believed that the defendant's
answers will not be perjurious. As to matters for which it is believed the defendant
will offer perjurious testimony, the lawyer should seek to avoid direct examination
of the defendant in the conventional manner; instead, the lawyer should ask the
defendant if he or she wishes to make any additional statement concerning the
case to the trier or triers of the facts. A lawyer may not later argue the defendant's
known false version of facts to the jury as worthy of belief, and may not recite or
rely upon the false testimony in his or her closing argument.
Id. Standard 4-7.7(c).
16. Wolfram, supra note 6, at 849 n.156 (quoting PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND THE DEFENSE FUNCTION
Supplement, at 18 (Approved Draft 1971)).
17. Id.; see supra note 5 for text of DR 7-102(A)(4) & (7) and EC 7-26.
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dress the problem of the perjurious client."' In August 1983, the
ABA House of Delegates approved Rule 3.3 of the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct (Model Rules).' Model Rule 3.3, entitled
"Candor Toward the Tribunal," includes no reference to the free
narrative. Indeed, the commentary on the rule rejects use of the
narrative. In the ABA's estimation, the free narrative "com-
promises both contending principles; it exempts the lawyer from
the duty to disclose false evidence but subjects the client to an
implicit disclosure of information imparted to counsel."20 Although
Standard 4-7.7 has not represented ABA policy since 1979 and no
longer exists in any form, it is still cited by defense counsel and
relied on by some courts.2 ' While Sanborn v. State2 was a case of
first impression in Florida concerning the free narrative approach,
several other state courts and four federal courts have tried to re-
solve the constitutional and practical difficulties inherent in the
Standard.
18. STANDARDS, supra note 12, at Standard 4-7.7.
19. Rule 3.3 provides in part:
(a) A lawyer shall not knowingly:
(1) make a false statement of material fact or law to a tribunal;
(2) fail to disclose a material fact to a tribunal when disclosure is necessary to
avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by the client;
(4) offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false. If a lawyer has offered
material evidence and comes to know of its falsity, the lawyer shall take reasona-
ble remedial measures.
(b) The duties stated in paragraph (a) continue to the conclusion of the proceed-
ing, and apply even if compliance requires disclosure of information otherwise
protected by Rule 1.6 [governing confidentiality of information between lawyer
and client].
(c) A lawyer may refuse to offer evidence that the lawyer reasonably believes is
false.
MODEL RULES OF PROeESSIONAL CONDUcT Rule 3.3 (1983).
20. Id. Rule 3.3 comment.
21. MacCarthy & Mejia, The Perjurious Client Question: Putting Criminal Defense
Lawyers Between a Rock and a Hard Place, 75 J. Caim. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1197, 1205
(1984). The United States Courts of Appeal for the Eighth and Ninth Circuits have ap-
proved the free narrative. Whiteside v. Scurr, 744 F.2d 1323 (8th Cir. 1984), rev'd, Nix v.
Whiteside, 106 S. Ct. 988 (1986); Lowery v. Cardwell, 575 F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 1978). The
Fifth and Seventh Circuits have implicitly rejected the approach. United States v. Curtis,
742 F.2d 1070 (7th Cir. 1984); McKissick v. United States, 379 F.2d 754 (5th Cir. 1967), aff'd
after remand, 398 F.2d 342 (5th Cir. 1968).
22. 474 So. 2d 309 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985).
896 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 14:891
II. CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
The criminal defendant's right to a fair trial is protected by the
due process clauses of the Constitution 23 and the sixth amend-
ment, which is applied to the states through the fourteenth
amendment. 24 The various provisions of the sixth amendment de-
fine the fundamental aspects of a fair trial, including the right to
assistance of counsel. 6 The sixth amendment right to counsel is
crucial to the adversarial system. Only with the skill and knowl-
edge provided by counsel can an accused effectively meet the
state's case. More fundamentally, the assistance of counsel allows
individuals involved in the trial and society at large to justifiably
rely on the trial's outcome.2 6
Under ABA policy, criminal defense counsel are not exempt
from the general rule that requires an advocate to disclose a cli-
ent's perjury concerning a material fact. 27 However, ABA commen-
tary in the Model Rules subordinates this ethical duty to due pro-
cess and right to counsel guarantees. These constitutional rights
may qualify an otherwise absolute ethical duty of defense counsel
to disclose client perjury to the tribunal.'
The Supreme Court recognizes that, whether appointed or re-
tained, an attorney must play an active role in the adversarial pro-
23. The fifth amendment provides, in part, that "[n]o person ... shall be compelled in
any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or prop-
erty, without due process of law..." U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
The fourteenth amendment provides, in part:
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
24. "Because these rights are basic to our adversary system of criminal justice, they are
part of the 'due process of law' that is guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to defend-
ants in the criminal courts of the States." Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 818 (1975).
See also Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339-42 (1963); United States ex rel. Reis v.
Wainwright, 525 F.2d 1269, 1273 (5th Cir. 1976).
25. The sixth amendment provides that:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by
law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be con-
fronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.
U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI.
26. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685, 692 (1984).
27. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3 comment (1983).
28. Id.
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cess.2 9 More than his mere presence at trial is required because the
sixth amendment guarantee encompasses "the right to the effec-
tive assistance of counsel."30 The purpose of effective assistance is
to guarantee a fair trial, although the elements that comprise such
assistance are not found in the constitutional language. "[The sixth
amendment] relies instead on the legal profession's maintenance of
standards sufficient to justify the law's presumption that counsel
will fulfill the role in the adversary process that the Amendment
envisions."31
There is support for the proposition that a constitutional right
to testify can be found in the confrontation and compulsory pro-
cess clauses and the due process clauses. 2 The Supreme Court has
yet to hold that a constitutional right to testify exists, but it has
asserted the proposition in dicta in numerous cases. In Harris v.
New York,"3 the Court noted that "[e]very criminal defendant is
privileged to testify in his own defense, or to refuse to do so."'" In
Faretta v. California,"e the Court, again in dictum, observed that it
"has often recognized the constitutional stature of rights that,
though not literally expressed in the document, are essential to due
process of law in a fair adversary process. It is now accepted, for
example, that an accused has a right. . . to testify on his own be-
half . ,, " To support this proposition, the Court cited only to
dicta in prior cases.3 7 In a recent decision, Nix v. Whiteside, s the
Court remarked that the due process right of an accused to testify
in his own behalf, while never explicitly held to exist, "has long
been assumed."3 9 The Court also referred to Harris for the pro-
position that the right to testify in one's own defense does not en-
compass the right to commit perjury; once a defendant takes the
29. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 685.
30. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970) (emphasis added).
31. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688.
32. Rieger, supra note 6, at 134-35. See, e.g., Whiteside v. Scurr, 744 F.2d 1323, 1329-30
(8th Cir. 1984), rev'd, Nix v. Whiteside, 106 S.Ct. 988 (1986); see also Wright v. Estelle, 572
F.2d 1071, 1076 (5th Cir.) (Godbold, J., dissenting) ("The right to testify also may be con-
sidered as included in the Sixth Amendment's guarantees of the defendant's right to meet
and deny the accusation against him, . . . his right to present evidence, and his right to
present witnesses on his behalf .... ." (citations omitted)), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1004
(1978).
33. 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
34. Id. at 225.
35. 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
36. Id. at 819 n.15.
37. Id. See also Rieger, supra note 6, at 131-32.
38. 106 S. Ct. 988 (1986).
39. Id. at 993.
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stand an obligation to speak truthfully attaches. 0 The Court noted
that "Harris and other cases make it crystal clear that there is no
right whatever-constitutional or otherwise-for a defendant to
use false evidence.' 14
III. FLORIDA AND THE FREE NARRATIVE
The Third District Court of Appeal noted that Sanborn v.
State2 was a case of first impression in Florida.3 Sanborn was to
stand jury trial on charges of first-degree murder and several other
crimes. Trial had been delayed for several months because
Sanborn had successfully claimed that conflicts warranted dismis-
sal of two of his three previous court-appointed attorneys. The
court permitted a fourth attorney, Ellis Rubin, to be substituted
only after receiving assurances from Sanborn that he would see the
process through with this defense counsel. However, on the day of
trial and just before jury selection, Rubin moved to withdraw.
Rubin declined to reveal his reasons for requesting withdrawal,
merely alluding to "new and contradictory details and heretofore
unknown explanations" provided to him by Sanborn and
Sanborn's mother." The trial court denied the motion and ordered
Rubin to proceed to trial. Rubin then petitioned the Third District
for writ of certiorari and the proceedings were stayed pending that
court's decision.
At the outset, the Third District recognized the role of defense
counsel "as a guardian of the integrity of the judicial system,"'45
and deemed Rubin's actions in keeping with the moral and ethical
obligations of an attorney. Rubin had told the trial court judge in
so many words that he believed his client would perjure himself,
and he refused to reveal any of the underlying facts. The court
cited DR 7-102(A) of the Florida Bar Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility46 for the proposition that a lawyer shall not knowingly
use perjured testimony or assist a client in knowingly fraudulent
conduct. The court also found germane EC 7-25, which provides
40. Id. at 998.
41. Id.
42. 474 So. 2d 309 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985).
43. The court relied in large measure on People v. Schultheis, 638 P.2d 8 (Colo. 1981),
and People v. Salquerro, 433 N.Y.S.2d 711 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980) in its analysis.
44. Sanborn, 474 So. 2d at 311.
45. Id.
46. See supra note 5.
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that a lawyer should not use subterfuge to present matters to a
jury that it ought not consider. 7
Without reference to Standard 4-7.7, the court invoked its provi-
sion governing the eventuality of a serious dispute between counsel
and client over the client's desire to offer false testimony, counsel
is to urge the client to refrain from perjury, but if the client will
not be dissuaded, counsel should request permission to withdraw. 8
Counsel must continue to serve if his motion to withdraw is denied
and "[slo long as the attorney performs competently as an advo-
cate under the circumstances, the defendant is represented effec-
tively and the integrity of the adversary system of justice is not
compromised."49
The Sanborn court concluded that a competent performance in-
cludes use of the free narrative, the procedure "most often sanc-
tioned" of those "formulas . . .which preserve the sanctity of the
tribunal."50 In the eyes of the court, use of the free narrative shifts
the responsibility for committing fraud on the tribunal entirely to
the defendent. If the attorney neither elicits nor argues the perjuri-
ous testimony, counsel does not "knowingly assist or participate in
the commission of perjury or the creation of false evidence."51
The court acknowledged that automatic withdrawal and reap-
pointment of defense counsel was not the solution. The court was
sensitive to at least two aspects of fraud that could be engendered
by permitting this "ostrich-like approach." 52 First, there is the op-
portunity to "play the system" through an endless series of late
motions to withdraw and subsequent continuances. The orderly
administration of justice, which the court deemed its primary re-
sponsibility, would certainly suffer from this procedural fraud. Sec-
ond, a substantive fraud would be committed upon the court. Sub-
stituted counsel might not discover or recognize that a client
intended perjury, and so present and argue false testimony to the
factfinder. Moreover, cynical counsel might do so willingly.53 Wit-
tingly or unwittingly, the party perpetrating the fraud would be
the substituted defense counsel. Thus it is a puzzle to determine
how Standard 4-7.7 and the free narrative operate to excuse de-
47. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONsiBILrrY EC 7-25 (1983).
48. Sanborn, 474 So. 2d at 312.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 313.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 314 (quoting Salquerro, 433 N.Y.S.2d at 713).
53. Id.
1987]
900 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 14:891
fense counsel from responsibility for that fraud. If the attorney
knows that perjury is imminent but allows the client to take the
stand and offer the perjury in narrative form, how is it that counsel
has not knowingly assisted or participated in the commission of
perjury or the creation of false evidence? The inescapable conclu-
sion is that never before has silence counted for so much.
That the court in Sanborn did not make a principled distinction
between silent and overt facilitation of perjury is evidenced by its
approval of the position taken by the Arizona Supreme Court in
State v. Lee. 4 When defense counsel is confronted with a perjuri-
ous client and must choose a course of action, the court directed:
In such a case, counsel must, within the confines of the law and
his or her professional duties and responsibilities, present the cli-
ent's case as well as he or she can. . . . Counsel must not compro-
mise the integrity of his or her client, the court, or the legal pro-
fession by exposing a client's proclivities or by engaging in
unethical conduct at a client's request.55
The concern of the Arizona Supreme Court and, by implication,
the Florida court, that defense counsel not compromise the client's
integrity is mystifying. One would suppose that the client's integ-
rity already had been compromised by his decision to testify
falsely. At that juncture, the larger concern should be with the in-
tegrity of the court and the legal profession. How defense counsel's
knowing silence in the face of perjury avoids institutional damage
is not explained by either court. An admonition to defense counsel
to simply try one's best to present a defense that will not offend
legal or ethical responsibilities is of no more help than simply
"throwing up one's hands."' 56 "To leave such choice open to the
sensitive and the responsible without giving them criteria for
choice is to leave it open as well to the insensitive and the cor-
rupt. '5 7 As a vehicle to bring perjured testimony before a pur-
posely unenlightened factfinder, the free narrative makes meaning-
less any distinctions between the responsible and the corrupt.
54. 689 P.2d 153 (Ariz. 1984). This case involved perjurious witnesses rather than a per-
jurious defendant, which altered the constitutional issue. See infra notes 77-87 and accom-
panying text.
55. Id. at 163-64.
56. S. BOK, LYING: MORAL CHOICE IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIFE 162 (1978).
57. Id.
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IV. APPLICATION IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS
Contrary to the court's assertion in Sanborn, Standard 4-7.7
cannot be regarded as a useful solution to the problem of the per-
jurious client. It has received a mixed response from those courts
which have considered its use, particularly with regard to the free
narrative.
A. Arizona
The oscillations of the Arizona courts addressing the problem of
the perjurious client expose the free narrative as ineffectual and an
impediment to criminal adjudication. Arizona cases demonstrate
the difficulties inherent in using the Standard to minimize the
damage caused by the perjurious client.
The Arizona Supreme Court in State v. Lowery58 assessed the
use of Standard 4-7.7 in a nonjury murder trial. Lowery had pled
not guilty. Trial court testimony established that the victim was
shot twice at close range while he was seated in a parked car. The
state's chief witness testified that he saw Lowery walk with the
victim to the car and wait until the the victim got in. Then the
witness heard firecracker sounds.5 9 From the witness stand, how-
ever, Lowery denied accompanying the victim or shooting him. De-
fense counsel Lyding then asked for a recess and, in chambers,
asked to withdraw. In accordance with Standard 4-7.7, Lyding did
not tell the court the reason for his withdrawal motion; the motion
was denied. When trial resumed, Lyding immediately stated that
he had no more questions for his client, and in his closing argu-
ment he made no use of her testimony. Lowery was convicted of
second-degree murder and the Supreme Court of Arizona
affirmed.60
The Arizona Supreme Court noted that Lyding's conduct was
unusual in that jurisdiction, and that the "better practice would
have been for [Lyding] to have refrained from further questioning
in areas of possible perjury and to have [made] a record 'in some
appropriate manner,'" but under the facts the court found no
prejudice against Lowery. The court concluded that, due to the
strength of the evidence against Lowery, Lyding's "conduct played
very little, if any, part in [Lowery's] conviction."'
58. 523 P.2d 54 (Ariz. 1974).
59. Lowery v. Cardwell, 575 F.2d 727, 728 (9th Cir. 1978).
60. Id. at 729.
61. Lowery, 523 P.2d at 57.
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit dis-
agreed and granted Lowery a writ of habeas corpus. In Lowery v.
Cardwell,"' the court held that Lyding's actions constituted a
"clear and unequivocal" announcement to the court as factfinder
that he believed his client had testified perjuriously, thus depriving
Lowery of her right to a fair trial.63 The court found no due pro-
cess violation in Lyding's compliance with the Standard by refus-
ing to assist in his client's perjury; rather, the court objected to his
motion to withdraw as constituting a wholesale surrender of the
client's interests in an active defense. In a special concurrence,
Judge Hufstedler sonorously observed that "[n]o matter how com-
mendable may have been counsel's motives, his interest in saving
himself from potential violation of the canons was adverse to his
client, and the end product was his abandonment of a diligent
defense. 64
Although Judge Hufstedler collapsed the ethical duty of an of-
ficer of the court into nothing more than parochial self-interest,
the majority acknowledged the anomalous result of declaring a
mistrial due to defense counsel's "bona fide efforts to avoid profes-
sional irresponsibility." 65 The court observed that in reconciling a
criminal defendant's right to due process with defense counsel's
ethical duty not to further false testimony, "the integrity of the
judicial process must be allowed to play a respectable role."66 The
court went no further in explaining what a "respectable" role
might consist of, but Lowery suggests that integrity enjoys only a
cameo appearance.
The Ninth Circuit distinguished Lowery in United States v.
Campbell7 on the sole basis that in the former case, the judge sat
as factfinder, while the latter was tried before a jury. 8 In Camp-
bell, defense counsel attempted to comply with Standard 4-7.7, but
62. 575 F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 1978).
63. Id. at 731.
64. Id. at 732 (Hufstedler, J., specially concurring).
65. Id. at 731.
66. Id.
67. 616 F.2d 1151 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 910 (1980).
68. A Texas appellate court has drawn the same distinction between factfinders. In
Maddox v. State, 613 S.W.2d 275 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981), defense counsels informed the
court of their client's intention to commit perjury. The defendant was permitted to testify
in narrative form. The court found the violation of Standard 4-7.7-explicity informing the
judge-to be minor because both findings of fact and sentencing devolved to the jury.
Damning with faint praise, the court offered its assessment of the free narrative: "[t]o say
that the method used in this case may not have been the best is not to say that it deprived
the appellant of effective assistance of counsel." Id. at 284.
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told the trial court in the jury's presence that Campbell was testi-
fying against his advice. The prosecutor unsuccessfully objected to
the narrative form of Campbell's testimony as irrelevant. Defense
counsel subsequently did not raise any objections to examination
by the prosecutor, nor did he use the narrative testimony in clos-
ing. On appeal from his armed robbery conviction in federal dis-
trict court, Campbell contended that his counsel's actions
amounted to informing the jury that Campbell had committed
perjury.69
Scarcely sounding like the same court, the Ninth Circuit stated
that it was a mistake to have so informed the court in the jury's
presence, but a mistake that any competent defense counsel might
make in the course of meeting ethical obligations.70 In Lowery, the
mere attempt to withdraw signaled the perjury and was fatal to the
client's interests, yet in Campbell the court overlooked a similar
action because the jury was regarded as unable to see the signifi-
cance of counsel's request to withdraw.
The Ninth Circuit's sanguine approach in Campbell appears to
have arisen from a belief that a jury is more easily misled than a
judge, and that a jury's misapprehensions do no damage to the
perjurious client. The court observed that a jury is not usually
aware of an attorney's ethical problems and "could. . . [interpret]
counsel's actions as a desire to keep Campbell off the stand so that
Campbell's prior robbery convictions would not be used for im-
peachment purposes and to protect Campbell from potentially
damaging cross-examination. 7 1
Its decision having been disapproved on collateral review in
Lowery, the Arizona Supreme Court displayed an abundance of
caution in State v. Jefferson.7 2 Defense counsel Lavoni sought to
withdraw just prior to Jefferson's testifying at his probation revo-
cation hearing; however, Lavoni would not reveal the specific rea-
sons for his request. The supreme court assessed the trial judge's
competence at about the same level as the Ninth Circuit had held
the jury's in Campbell. The court's review of the record showed
that the trial judge had not "fully grasped the implications of
counsel's statements" but because of the obvious inference that
Jefferson planned to perjure himself, the court surmised that
"[s]uch an inference would eventually have occurred to the trial
69. Campbell, 616 F.2d at 1152.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 1153.
72. 615 P.2d 638 (Ariz. 1980).
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judge, .... [thus] [tihe attempt to withdraw was an unequivocal
announcement of the attorney's disbelief of the truthfulness of his
client's testimony. 78 The parole revocation was reversed based on
the impermissible prejudice to Jefferson caused by Lavoni's con-
duct. The court directed that on remand, the revocation be deter-
mined by a different judge.74
After Jefferson, any attempt to withdraw by defense counsel in
conformance with Standard 4-7.7 amounted to clear notice of the
client's intended or actual perjury and was thus unacceptable.
However, such a stance did little to resolve the conflict between
professional integrity and responsible advocacy. Attempts to with-
draw proved no solution. Nor was a remedy provided by waiver of
right to counsel or waiver of closing argument.
An Arizona Court of Appeals panel held in State v. Long7 5 that a
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel would not be heard from a
defendant who insisted on waiving right to counsel so he could re-
present himself in order to question his wife on the witness stand.
His attorney believed Long's wife would commit perjury and re-
fused to call her as a witness. The court cited Standard 4-7.7 and
the Lowery decision in approving defense counsel's refusal to in-
clude the testimony of the defendant and his wife in his closing
argument. However, the court reversed the conviction because, in
his rebuttal, the prosecutor had referred twice to the fact that de-
fense counsel in closing argument had conspicuously omitted refer-
ence to the wife's statements which absolved Long of guilt.76
The court's decision demonstrates an additional burden of si-
lence that use of the free narrative places on the state. The court
observed that in Lowery v. CardweUl7 the Ninth Circuit found a
denial of due process once the factfinder knew of defense counsel's
belief that the defendant had testified perjuriously. The state ap-
pellate court drew "no distinction when the prosecutor invites the
jury to infer that which it cannot be told. 7 8 It appears that the
state may comment on the use of the free narrative only at the risk
of committing prejudicial error. The narrative thus operates to si-
lence both prosecution and defense.
73. Id. at 641.
74. Id.
75. 714 P.2d 465 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986).
76. Id. at 467.
77. 575 F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 1978).
78. 714 P.2d 465, 467 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986).
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
State v. Lee's was another abortive attempt by an Arizona court
to fashion an ethical and realistic course of conduct for counsel
faced with the prospect of perjurious testimony. In Lee, defense
counsel independently determined that two defense witnesses
planned to commit perjury. Nevertheless, counsel elicited free nar-
rative testimony from them, believing he was compelled to do so
because of his client's sixth amendment right to present witnesses
in his own behalf. Counsel then waived closing argument rather
than argue perjured testimony to the jury.80 At a post-trial eviden-
tiary hearing, defense counsel stated: "I felt like I had some ethical
problems standing up in front of the jury and arguing something
that I felt was perjured. In fact, I was convinced and positive that
it was perjured. . .. And I think I have some responsibility other
than just get my guy off at any costs."81
Defense counsel relied on his perception of sixth amendment
rights to justify calling witnesses for his client, even though he be-
lieved they would lie. The appellate court first stated that there is
no constitutional right of defendants to call a witness, much less a
witness who presumably will offer perjured testimony.82 The court
then concluded from the record that it would have been possible
for defense counsel to argue a theory of defense without referring
to the tainted testimony; therefore, the waiver of final argument
constituted ineffective assistance of counsel.83
When Lee was heard on review," the Arizona Supreme Court
invoked the test established by the United States Supreme Court
in Strickland v. Washington.8" Under Strickland, a court must
find that counsel's conduct failed to meet the requirements of the
sixth amendment assistance of counsel provision, and that the con-
duct was prejudicial to the defendant.86 The trial court in Lee had
found that defense counsel's decision to call the alibi witnesses was
not a deliberate trial strategy but was based on an erroneous belief
concerning his client's rights. Had it been a purely tactical deci-
sion, the Arizona Supreme Court would not have considered waiver
of closing argument as grounds for a claim of ineffective assistance
79. 689 P.2d 170 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983), vacated, 689 P.2d 153 (Ariz. 1984).
80. Id. at 172.
81. Id. at 174.
82. Id. at 173. The court cited to DR 7-102(A)(4), which "specifically precludes an attor-
ney from knowingly using perjured testimony . . . in his representation of a client." Id.
83. Id. at 175.
84. State v. Lee, 689 P.2d 153 (Ariz. 1984).
85. 466 U.S. 686 (1984).
86. Id. at 687.
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of counsel. However, the court held that "[t]rial decisions that ap-
pear to be based on counsel's beliefs respecting his or her duty to
the court rather than his or her professional assessment of strate-
gic options are . . . subject to judicial review." '
In considering the appellant's claim of ineffective assistance
based on trial counsel's disclosure to the court, the supreme court
agreed that counsel was in an ethical dilemma. The defendant did
not have a right to call perjurious witnesses. Moreover, if defense
counsel for ethical or tactical reasons decided against calling a par-
ticular witness, he had to follow through with that decision. If the
client was seriously antagonized by this, counsel should have re-
quested permission to withdraw, explaining only that an irreconcil-
able conflict made further representation too difficult.88 The court
outlined these guidelines because "no previous Arizona authority
existed to offer counsel guidance." 8' 9 Apparently the supreme
court's decision only four years before in Jefferson had become an
inconvenient precedent. In Jefferson, defense counsel's motion to
withdraw was characterized as a virtual announcement that the cli-
ent planned to commit perjury.' 0
B. Kansas
Whether and to what extent the participants in a criminal trial
know perjured testimony is in the offing is a particularly troubling
aspect of the free narrative. The Kansas Supreme Court in State v.
Henderson," in upholding Henderson's conviction, suggested that
defense counsel
is never under a duty to perpetrate or aid in the perpetration of a
crime or a dishonest act to free his client. Neither is he required
to stultify himself by tendering evidence or making any statement
which he knows to be false as a matter of fact in an attempt to
obtain an acquittal at any cost.' 2
87. Lee, 689 P.2d at 161. The court cited Johns v. Smyth, 176 F. Supp. 949, 953 (E.D.
Va. 1959), for the proposition that "[t]he failure to argue the case before the jury, while
ordinarily only a trial tactic not subject to review, manifestly enters the field of incompe-
tency when the reason assigned is the attorney's conscience."
88. Lee, 689 P.2d at 163.
89. Id. at 158.
90. See supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
91. 468 P.2d 136 (Kan. 1970).
92. Id. at 140.
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Four days before trial Henderson told his attorney, Anderson, a
new story that would aid in his defense. When Anderson declined
to be a party to a false story, Henderson responded that he "was
willing to run the risk of perjury.""s Before trial, Anderson in-
formed the state and the court of his client's potential perjury and
unsuccessfully sought to withdraw. Ultimately, Harrison did not
take the stand, although Anderson and the court informed the de-
fendant that he had the right "to tell his story. ' 94 The court failed
to explain how it is that defense counsel can affirmatively act to
put his client on the stand to deliver perjurious testimony, and not
thereby aid in the perpetration of a crime.
In State v. Fosnight, 5 defense counsel moved to withdraw, stat-
ing in chambers that he was "caught in a classic awkward profes-
sional situation."" When he declined to tell the judge the reason
for his request, the prosecutor suggested that defense counsel must
have been made aware that defendant Fosnight intended to testify
perjuriously. The judge suggested that Fosnight be told that prose-
cution and conviction for perjury would constitute his third felony
offense. When trial resumed, the defendant was sworn and gave
free narrative testimony.9 7
The Kansas Supreme Court observed that the request to with-
draw "did not inform the trial judge of anything he would not have
surmised at once had counsel simply put the defendant on the
stand and permitted him to proceed to tell his story without en-
couragement or help from counsel."'98 The court distinguished
Lowery on grounds that the Fosnight trial was by jury, while the
court was the factfinder in Lowery. Because the jury was unaware
of the substance of the in-chambers conference, the court found
that Fosnight's right to a fair trial had not been prejudiced. 99
The Arizona decisions, as well as the two Kansas opinions, pre-
sent the inescapable conclusion that under Standard 4-7.7, a fair
trial for a perjurious client necessarily requires an ignorant
factfinder. The Kansas Supreme Court acknowledged that a judge
sitting as factfinder would immediately suspect perjury if free nar-
rative testimony were offered; a request to withdraw would engen-
93. Id. at 138.
94. Id. at 142.
95. 679 P.2d 174 (Kan. 1984).
96. Id. at 177.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 180 (emphasis added).
99. Id. at 181.
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der the same suspicion. The logical conclusion is that a fair trial
before a judge precludes use of the Standard unless the judge is
deaf, dumb, and blind. A fair trial before a jury may only be had if
the jury remains ignorant of that which the client, defense counsel,
prosecutor, and judge are already aware: perjury is in the air. At
the very least the jury must be so naive that it is unable to read
the signs of client perjury embodied in defense counsel's actions.
C. New York
The passivity demanded by the free narrative serves to excuse
fraud in the estimation of one New York trial court. In People v.
Salquerro,00 the defendant Salquerro was accused of beating and
stabbing his victim during a robbery. Just prior to trial, Salquerro
told his attorney, Hallinan, that he was going to lie when testifying
in his own behalf. Hallinan revealed his client's intention to the
court and to the prosecutor, then sought to withdraw on the
ground that his disclosure to the court made effective assistance of
counsel problematic. 01
In the court's estimation, an attorney who would knowingly offer
perjurious testimony practices a fraud on the tribunal. Thus, the
court attempted to link Standard 4-7.7 with two disciplinary rules
of the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility that prohibit an
attorney from knowingly using perjured testimony and require an
attorney to reveal a fraud upon a tribunal.10 2 In so doing, the court
formulated a two-step process to be followed: the attorney must
first inform the court of the client's intention to commit perjury,
and then follow Standard 4-7.7(c), which provides that defense
counsel make a record on his belief that perjury is imminent
"without revealing the fact to the court."'03
More troubling than the internal inconsistency in this two-step
approach was the court's cursory treatment of the effect of the
Standard on defense counsel. In the court's view, the defendant's
rights to assistance of counsel and to speak to the jury under oath
are preserved, and at the same time "the defense attorney is pro-
tected from participation in the fraud."'' The court simply grants
that a fraud has been perpetrated by use of the Standard, yet ac-
100. 433 N.Y.S.2d 711 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980).
101. Id. at 712.
102. See supra note 5.
103. 433 N.Y.S.2d at 714 (quoting STANDARDS, supra note 12, at Standard 4-7.7).
104. Id. (emphasis added).
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cords defense counsel the status of a nonparticipant if, during his
client's perjury, he will only stand mute as a wooden-headed
puppet.10
D. District of Columbia
The District of Columbia courts have treated Standard 4-7.7 as
appropriate for both bench and jury trials yet also have suggested
that defense counsel may nevertheless be subject to discipline if
the Standard is used. In Thornton v. United States,'" the court of
appeals affirmed a trial court decision which held that Thornton
was not denied effective assistance of counsel although his attorney
followed Standard 4-7.7. In a familiar scenario, on the eve of his
trial, the defendant, faced with strong evidence of his guilt, formu-
lated an alibi. Defense counsel sought to withdraw, after explaining
to the judge and prosecutor his ethical dilemma: "My client now
decides he is going to state another and completely different story
than what he told me before, which I know enough to be true. In
presenting it to the Court in this case I feel that I would be violat-
ing the canons of ethics."' 0 7
The trial judge was sympathetic and imaginative. In a maneuver
the appellate court characterized as a "novel solution," the trial
judge did not rule on the motion to withdraw. Instead, he certified
the case to a second judge, instructed that judge not to ask coun-
sel's reason for attempting to withdraw, and suggested to counsel
that he follow Standard 4-7.7. Leave to withdraw was denied by
the second judge, reasonably so, because no justifiable explanation
was offered. Trial resumed "with defense counsel's ethical problem
undiminished."108
However, in violation of the Standard, defense counsel informed
the second judge that Thornton would take the stand against his
advice. The defendant did take the stand and presented a "trans-
parent" alibi, with minimal assistance from defense counsel. Any
shred of credibility the testimony may have had was lost when the
government impeached Thornton with prior inconsistent state-
ments. Defense counsel did conform to the Standard in making no
105. Foster, The Devil's Advocate, 8 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 229, 231 (1980).
106. 357 A.2d 429 (D.C.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1024 (1976).
107. Id. at 432.
108. Id.
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mention of the perjured testimony in closing argument, instead
choosing to attack the government's evidence. 10 9
After Thornton was convicted of felony murder, armed robbery,
and assault with a dangerous weapon, he claimed ineffective assis-
tance of counsel. Thornton maintained that "counsel's perform-
ance at trial was so influenced by his belief that his client's
changed story was not truthful, and by his consequent desire to
disassociate himself from the perjurious testimony, that he failed
to provide vigorous assistance to his client."110 The court, on the
other hand, described counsel's performance as meritorious and
observed that counsel's use of the Standard did not "significantly"
advance the alibi testimony, nor did counsel "foist" on the court a
perjurious defense."'
While the court of appeals in Thornton did not dispute the trial
court's suggestion that counsel adhere to Standard 4-7.7, it did
find objectionable a similar tack by the trial court in Johnson v.
United States.11 2 The trial court perceived inconsistencies between
Johnson's two proffered defenses and was of the opinion that de-
fense counsel would suborn perjury if he aided in presenting the
second version. The trial court approved the approach of Standard
4-7.7 and indicated that ethical canons required defense counsel to
employ the free narrative. However, the appellate court refused to
extend the logic of Thornton to allow the Standard to be imposed
by the court rather than be self-imposed by defense counsel.11
The appellate court rejected the proposition that the trial court
was under any responsibility to oversee an attorney's ethical con-
duct during the trial. The court suggested that if a trial court sus-
pects that a defendant intends perjury and it disapproves of coun-
sel's decision to put the client on the stand, the proper recourse is
for the trial court "to report the matter to the Board of Profes-
sional Responsibility for such disciplinary action as may be indi-
cated." " Under Thornton and Johnson, both jury cases, defense
counsel retains full responsibility with regard to use of the free
narrative. The court may notify defense counsel of suspicions con-
cerning a defendant's testimony, but counsel alone must decide
whether use of the Standard is appropriate.
109. Id. at 433-34.
110. Id. at 437.
111. Id. at 438.
112. 404 A.2d 162 (D.C. 1979).
113. Id. at 164.
114. Id. at 165.
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The court of appeals labored to reconcile Thornton and Johnson
in Butler v. United States' 6 involving a bench trial. A split court
reversed Butler's conviction for assaulting a police officer and car-
rying an unlicensed firearm. Butler privately admitted to his attor-
ney that he had a gun at the time of his arrest, this admission was
consistent with the police report. At a preliminary motion hearing,
defense counsel stated his expectation that his client wanted to
testify "because he's told me before that he had the pistol, and
today for the first time he tells me that's not true.""' 6
Because Butler was given a bench trial before the same judge
who presided over the motion hearing, the court held that Butler
received ineffective assistance of counsel. By approving the proce-
dure in Standard 4-7.7 as the preferable course of action, the court
reaffirmed the "implicit holdings" of Thornton and Johnson."7
The plurality perverted what scant rationale is found in Lowery v.
Cardwell"8 by implying that the Standard could be used in a
bench trial so long as counsel does not "act in such a fashion as to
disclose his quandary to the factfinder."' The court thus over-
looked entirely the admonition in Lowery that compliance with the
first step of the Standard, moving to withdraw, would inform the
factfinder that defendant's testimony was perjurious.
The dissent correctly observed that in Thornton, the court had
in fact held that a defendant was not deprived of effective assis-
tance of counsel when defense counsel complied with the Standard,
and that under Johnson the trial judge may not force the Standard
on defense counsel. 20 Neither opinion even suggested that the
Standard enjoyed preference over other approaches. According to
the dissent, defense counsel would be better served by looking to
the court's rules to resolve the problem, "rather than the recom-
mendations of a nonjudicial organization, no matter how
respected."'' Finally, the dissent noted its inability to see how
Butler was deprived of due process, "unless the majority feels that
appellant was entitled to a trial before a judge ignorant of his in-
tention to commit perjury and therefore perhaps ready to swallow
115. 414 A.2d 844 (D.C. 1980) (en banc).
116. Id. at 845.
117. Id. at 850.
118. 575 F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 1978).
119. 414 A.2d at 850 (quoting Lowery v. Cardwell, 575 F.2d 727, 731 (9th Cir. 1978)).
120. Id. at 858 (Reilly, C.J., dissenting).
121. Id.
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whole whatever testimony appellant chose to give in that
proceeding. '12 2
E. Colorado
One of the precedents relied upon by the Florida court in
Sanborn v. State23 was People v. Schultheis.1 2 4 In that case, the
Colorado Supreme Court drew an analytical distinction between
the client who wishes to elicit perjurious testimony from alibi wit-
nesses and one who wishes to testify perjuriously in his own behalf.
Like the Arizona case, State v. Lee, 20 Schultheis concerned alibi
witnesses.12
6
The facts involved a particularly brutal rape and murder com-
mitted by Schultheis, a prison inmate. After offering a plea of not
guilty by reason of insanity, Schultheis was examined by two
court-appointed psychiatrists. In the course of one examination,
the defendant gave a highly detailed description of the manner in
which he had killed the victim. 12 7 Results of the psychiatric exami-
nations were made available to the prosecutor, trial judge, and de-
fense counsel.1 28
On the day of trial, Schultheis requested a continuance on
grounds that his attorney was inadequate and unprepared. The
trial court denied the motion and also denied defense counsel's re-
quest to withdraw due to irreconcilable differences. Schultheis and
counsel were allowed to make a private record to set out the basis
of their disagreement. According to this record, defense counsel re-
fused to subpoena two alibi witnesses because he thought they
would testify falsely that Schultheis was not in the cell with the
victim at the time of the murder. In fact, Schultheis admitted the
killing to psychiatrists and to counsel. After making his record, to
which the judge and prosecutor were not given access, defense
122. Id. at 861.
123. 474 So. 2d 309 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985).
124. 638 P.2d 8 (Colo. 1981).
125. 689 P.2d 153 (Ariz. 1984); see supra notes 79-89 and accompanying text.
126. With regard to the perjurious client, the court may, by implication, have approved
the solution suggested by Erickson, supra note 5, at 88-91. Schultheis, 638 P.2d at 11, n.3.
Erickson proposed the adoption of ABA Defense Standard 4-1.4, see STANDARDS, supra note
12, at Standard 4-1.4, which provides for an advisory council of trial lawyers that would,
through a system of written statements and recommendations, help resolve ethical dilem-
mas such as the perjurious defendant. The council would preclude need for the free narra-
tive option. In any case, the court in Schultheis did not endorse the free narrative.
127. Schultheis, 638 P.2d at 10 n.2.
128. Id. at 10 n.1.
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counsel continued to represent Schultheis, who was ultimately con-
victed of first-degree murder. 2
9
The state supreme court affirmed the conviction, holding that "a
lawyer may not offer testimony of a witness which he knows is
false, fraudulent, or perjured."' 30 To hold otherwise would have al-
lowed defense counsel to suborn perjury, and the court refused to
allow "the truthfinding process to be deflected by the presentation
of false evidence by an officer of the court."'' The court discussed
the necessity that counsel, before requesting permission to with-
draw, attempt to dissuade the client from calling witnesses who
will perjure themselves. But, the court did not endorse use of the
free narrative in this context. It merely remarked that continued
"competent performance" by defense counsel, whatever that may
entail, would ensure effective representation and thus leave un-
scathed the adversary system of justice. 32 According to the Su-
preme Court of Colorado, the integrity of trial proceedings is held
intact if the factfinder remains "untainted by accusations that the
defendant had insisted upon presenting fabricated testimony." 33
F. The Seventh and Fifth Circuits
In addressing the claim that putting on no defense at all
amounts to ineffective assistance of counsel, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit observed in United
States v. Ramsey134 that "[slomething can be worse than nothing.
An incredible defense may lead the judge to augment the punish-
ment" 385 based on the defendant's perjury. When there is "'no
bona fide defense to the charge, counsel cannot create one and may
disserve the interest of his client by attempting a useless
charade.' ,, 0
Prior to Ramsey the Seventh Circuit had decided United States
v. Curtis,'17 in which defense counsel Gant refused to put his client
on the stand. Gant offered two reasons for this decision. One was
that if Curtis were put on the stand the defense would be hurt by
129. Id. at 10.
130. Id. at 11.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 13.
133. Id.
134. 785 F.2d 184 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 2924 (1986).
135. Id. at 194 (emphasis in original).
136. Id. (quoting United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 656-57 n.19 (1984)).
137. 742 F.2d 1070 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1374 (1986).
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exposure on cross-examination of Curtis' prior convictions. Also,
Gant believed that Curtis would perjure himself because he had
previously admitted to Gant his participation in the crime."8
The court limited the scope of its decision to the sole issue of
whether Gant's actions infringed on the defendant's constitutional
right to testify truthfully in his own behalf.13 9 The court found no
such infringement and added that there is no constitutional right
to testify perjuriously in one's own behalf,1"0 foreshadowing the
Supreme Court's view in Nix v. Whiteside."" The court declined
to address whether counsel's actions conformed to professional
standards, although it noted the existence of Standard 4-7.7.1,2
While the Seventh Circuit did not take a position, the Supreme
Court has cited Curtis for the proposition that the Seventh Circuit
is among those courts that have rejected the free narrative in favor
of a more rigorous standard. 148
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit by im-
plication disapproved the free narrative in McKissick v. United
States."'1 Defendant McKissick was on trial for unlawfully selling
amphetamines to a federal drug agent. At the close of his testi-
mony, presumably obtained through the usual mode of question
and answer, the trial judge dismissed the jury for the day. The
court then put a number of questions to McKissick in the manner
of a cross examination. The trial judge then remarked that McKis-
sick's performance was "'the worst case of perjury. . .I have ever
seen since I have been on the Bench.' 1" That evening, McKissick
called his defense counsel, Lowery, and admitted to the perjury.
The following day, defense counsel reported his conversation to the
trial court and successfully moved for a mistrial."1
The Fifth Circuit noted that the lower court correctly declared a
mistrial based on the report of his client's perjury by defense coun-
sel "who is an officer of the court and whose integrity the court
itself ordinarily is in position to judge." '17 One reason Lowery was
obligated to report McKissick's perjury was the necessity "to with-
138. Id. at 1075.
139. Id. at 1076 n.4.
140. Id at 1076.
141. 106 S. Ct. 988 (1986); see supra text accompanying notes 165-74.
142. Curtis, 742 F.2d at 1076-77 n.4
143. Nix v. Whiteside, 106 S. Ct. 988, 996 n.6 (1986).
144. 379 F.2d 754 (5th Cir. 1967), aff'd after remand, 398 F.2d 342 (5th Cir. 1968).
145. Id. at 758.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 761.
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draw the perjured testimony from the consideration of the jury."' 8
The court noted with approval the case of In re King," 9 where the
Utah Supreme Court made clear the professional, ethical, and pub-
lic duty to disclose a client's perjury:
We cannot permit a member of the bar to exonerate himself
from failure to disclose known perjury by a . . . statement that
• . . he had a duty of non-disclosure so as to protect his client
which is paramount to his duty to disclose the same to the court,
of which he is an officer, and to which he in fact, owes a primary
duty under circumstances such as are evidenced in this case. 150
The Fifth Circuit reiterated this view, finding disclosure "essen-
tial for good judicial administration and to protect the public."''
Among the federal courts, the Fifth Circuit has the clearest view of
the duty owed by defense counsel as an officer of the court. Per-
haps for that reason, the Fifth Circuit accords a higher place to the
truthfinding function of a trial than does any other federal circuit
court. That function can only be hindered by the free narrative.
G. Iowa
In State v. Whiteside,3 2 the Supreme Court of Iowa affirmed a
second-degree murder conviction. Defendant Whiteside had
stabbed his victim to death during an argument over a drug deal.
Whiteside maintained that he "thought" the victim had a gun and
therefore he had acted in self-defense. A week before trial, he told
his defense counsel, Robinson, and an associate, Paulsen, that he
had actually seen a gun in the victim's hand. When pressed for
details, Whiteside retorted that if he didn't say he saw a gun, he
would be "dead.'1 5 3
Robinson first told Whiteside that even if there were no gun, a
defense could be mounted based on his reasonable belief that the
victim was reaching for a gun. Robinson also informed his client
that any recollections beyond reasonable belief would be perjury
and that he would not permit his client to testify falsely. Robinson
added that he might have to inform the court of the perjury and
148. Id.
149. 322 P.2d 1095 (Utah 1958).
150. Id. at 1097, cited with approval in McKissick, 379 F.2d at 761 n.2.
151. McKissick, 379 F.2d at 761.
152. 272 N.W.2d 468 (Iowa 1978).
153. Id. at 470
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probably would be permitted to impeach that testimony. 154 In a
post-trial motion, Whiteside claimed that he was denied a fair trial
because Robinson would not allow him to present what would have
been a good defense. 5
In affirming Whiteside's conviction the Supreme Court of Iowa
cited a Third Circuit opinion for the proposition that defense
counsel ought not act as factfinder, deciding the truthfulness or
falsity of evidence unless there exists compelling support for coun-
sel's conclusion. 156 The court found strong support for Robinson's
apprehension of imminent perjury and recognized that counsel's
action was justified under the Iowa Code of Professional Responsi-
bility for Lawyers, including DR 4-101(C) and DR 7-102(A)(4).57
Whiteside subsequently sought a writ of habeas corpus, claiming
that counsel's threats to withdraw, inform the trial judge, and pos-
sibly testify against him violated his right to effective assistance of
counsel and the right to marshal a defense. The district court de-
nied the petition and Whiteside appealed to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.156
In Whiteside v. Scurr,15 9 the Eighth Circuit assumed for pur-
poses of analysis that Whiteside would have testified falsely. The
court agreed that Robinson's actions prevented the defendant from
testifying falsely. Incredibly, the court then held that because
Whiteside was prevented from lying to the factfinder, he was de-
nied due process and effective assistance of counsel.1 60 Having
characterized counsel's remonstrance as a threat, the court had no
difficulty finding both unethical conduct and a deprivation of con-
stitutional rights. Although the court took pains to disassociate it-
self from any ethical considerations, it did state that Robinson had
breached his state code, the Model Rules, and Standard 4-7.7.''1
The Eighth Circuit denied a motion for rehearing en banc.16 In
a strenuous dissent, a minority of the court objected to the essence
154. Nix v. Whiteside, 106 S. Ct. 988, 992 (1986).
155. Whiteside, 272 N.W.2d at 470.
156. Id. (citing United States ex rel. Wilcox v. Johnson, 555 F.2d 115, 120 (3d Cir.
1977)).
157. Id. at 471. See supra note 5 for discussion of these provisions.
158. Whiteside v. Scurr, 744 F.2d 1323, 1326 (8th Cir. 1984), rev'd, 106 S. Ct. 988 (1986).
159. Id.
160. Id. at 1328-31.
161. Id. at 1329-31. The court appended the Standard and Model Rule 3.3 to the opin-
ion. See supra notes 13-15 & 19 for the text of these provisions.
162. Whiteside v. Scurr, 750 F.2d 713 (8th Cir. 1984). In its order denying rehearing, the
court claimed its prior opinion did not create a right to commit perjury. Id. at 714.
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of the panel's opinion: "that a lawyer who makes use of a private
dialogue with his client to dissuade the client from testifying
falsely is burdened by a conflict of interest, is disloyal, is less than
zealous, and is guilty of compromising the client's right to testify
in his own defense."' 63 The dissent preferred the rationale of the
Iowa Supreme Court, wherein a duty of honest, loyal, and faithful
representation is owed a client, but only to the extent of using fair
and honorable means. 64
The United States Supreme Court also preferred the state
court's rationale. In Nix v. Whiteside,'" the Supreme Court unani-
mously reversed the Eighth Circuit. Four justices joined Chief Jus-
tice Burger in declining to stretch an attorney's duty of confidenti-
ality to cover the client's perjury. The court likened the crime of
perjury under the facts of Whiteside to the crime of threatening or
tampering with a witness or juror. As an officer of the court and a
key figure in the criminal justice system, an ethical lawyer's re-
sponsibility remains the same when faced with any of those actions
by a client. 66
All the justices agreed there had been no violation of defendant's
sixth amendment rights under the first prong of the Strickland
test.' 67 In judging whether there was prejudice as required for re-
lief under the second part of the Strickland inquiry, the Court
again observed that " '[a] defendant has no entitlement to the luck
of a lawless decisionmaker.' "166 The majority believed Robinson's
conduct easily came within accepted standards of professional con-
duct whether viewed as a threat or as a successful attempt to dis-
courage Whiteside from testifying perjuriously.' 6 ' The Court noted
that the free narrative has been found by most courts as well as
the American Bar Association to be incompatible with established
standards of ethical behavior.17 0 Justice Blackmun disagreed with
the majority approach in canvassing the range of reasonable pro-
fessional conduct.' 7 ' The Court in Strickland had suggested the
easier and more usual course of disposing of an ineffectiveness
163. Id. at 717. (Fagg, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
164. Id. at 719 (quoting State v. Whiteside, 272 N.W.2d 468, 470 (Iowa 1978)).
165. 106 S. Ct. 988 (1986).
166. Id. at 998.
167. See supra notes 81 & 83.
168. Whiteside, 106 S. Ct. at 999 (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 695
(1984)).
169. Id. at 997.
170. Id. at 996 n.6.
171. Id. at 1000 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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claim on the ground that sufficient prejudice was absent. 7 ' There-
fore, a court should first examine prejudice suffered by the defend-
ant and only if absolutely necessary examine counsel's perform-
ance for deficiencies.1 73 Because the only federal issue in the case
was whether counsel's conduct deprived Whiteside of effective as-
sistance, it was inappropriate for the Court to determine whether
Robinson's behavior conformed to one or another code of legal eth-
ics. For Justice Blackmun, "[t]he signal merit of asking first
whether a defendant has shown any adverse prejudicial effect
before inquiring into his attorney's performance is that it avoids
unnecessary federal interference in a State's regulation of its
bar. 17 4 Clearly, Justice Blackmun would allow states to maintain
their myriad approaches to a thorny ethical problem.
V. PRACTICAL DEFICIENCIES OF THE FREE NARRATIVE
In addition to reflecting the damage done to the integrity of the
judicial system through use of the free narrative, these cases illus-
trate other difficulties engendered by that approach. It has been
suggested that observing Standard 4-7.7 may result in prejudicial
error and in a quality of advocacy that, while not ineffective, is
certainly compromised.175 Even those scholars amenable to use of
the narrative presuppose the honesty of the narrator. "[The) prime
and essential virtue, then, [of narrative testimony] consists in cor-
rectly reproducing and intelligibly expressing the actual and sin-
cere recollection.17 6
Generally, it is within the discretion of the court to determine
the manner in which witnesses are interrogated.17 7 A prosecutor
could object to a defendant's offer of free narrative testimony on
the ground that its use would allow no chance for prosecutorial
objections to inadmissible evidence before it is heard by the
factfinder. Should the judge sustain such an objection, the Stan-
172. Id. at 1003 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697).
173. Id. at 1006.
174. Id.
175. Comment, The Perjury Dilemma in an Adversary System, 82 DICK. L. REV. 545,
566-70 (1978).
176. 3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 766 (Chadbourn rev. 1970) (emphasis in original).
177. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 90.612 (1985), which provides in part: "(1) The judge shall
exercise reasonable control over the mode and order of the interrogation of witnesses and
the presentation of evidence, so as to: (a) Facilitate, through effective interrogation and
presentation, the discovery of the truth." This statute is virtually identical to FED. R. EViD.
611(a).
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dard offers no further guidance to defense counsel. 178 If the narra-
tive is allowed and defendant must withstand cross-examination,
the Standard implies that defense counsel may not engage in redi-
rect. Further, the Standard is silent on the question whether de-
fense counsel may object to a prosecutor's improper line of ques-
tioning.17 9  Counsel may have relinquished the chance to
rehabilitate his client's credibility even on subjects not related to
the perjury.180
Additionally, the free narrative reveals more than it conceals.
Because it is rarely used, it constitutes an abrupt change from de-
fense counsel's usually active and aggressive examination of a de-
fendant or witness. 181 A presiding judge with any degree of intelli-
gence and experience will immediately be alerted that something is
amiss. Regarding the futility of the device, one commentator has
noted "that the trial judge will likely be made aware by the free
narrative of the fact that the defense attorney believes that the
client is lying on the stand was virtually conceded by the principal
architect of the Standards.' 82
Further complications arise if the testimony is offered during a
bench trial. Most jurisdictions permit a sentencing judge to take
into consideration a belief that a defendant offered false testimony
in his own behalf.'8" The defendant might thus be prejudiced at
the sentencing phase if a judge is aware of defense counsel's belief
that his client has committed perjury. An argument can be made,
however, that any resulting prejudice is not unwarranted because a
more burdensome sentence is appropriate for a defendant who has
tried to gain acquittal through perjured testimony. 184 These
problems are not avoided when trial is before a jury. While initially
a jury might be unaware that it is hearing lies from the defendant,
common sense suggests that the obvious conclusion eventually will
be drawn, possibly when defense counsel makes a half-hearted or
unconvincing closing argument without mentioning the client's tes-
178. M. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM 37 (1975).
179. Comment, supra note 175, at 566 n.174.
180. Id. at 567 n.175.
181. Wolfram, supra note 6, at 849-50. Usually, "[t]he testimony of a witness is elicited
by the propounding of questions to him after he has been sworn and under the supervision
of the judge. The questions must call for relevant and material testimony and must be free
from vagueness, uncertainty, or ambiguity." 2 S. A. GARD, FLORIDA EVIDENCE Rule 21:02 (2d
ad. 1980).
182. Wolfram, supra note 6, at 850 n.157.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 850.
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timony. 8s It has been observed that a defendant is not well served
by defense counsel who will "simply [allow] the client to jump off
the perjury precipice with the unjustified hope of landing safely in
the outstretched arms of a sympathetic jury."186 A defendant who
has the heart but not the mind for perjury may produce an utterly
incoherent free-flow narrative and thereby alienate a jury.18 7 Over-
all, it seems an illusory hope that a jury will remain sympathetic in
the face of a free narrative.
Finally, the free narrative has an adverse effect on the qual-
ity-even the existence-of defense counsel's closing argument.
Because the Standard precludes mention of the perjurious testi-
mony, counsel's silence may well be interpreted as a confirmation
of the client's guilt, especially if there is not much other evidence
to develop. Defense counsel, if sufficiently demoralized, may waive
closing argument or make only a perfunctory argument.188 In Her-
ring v. New York, 89 the Supreme Court recognized how important
closing argument is for the defense in a criminal case. In it, the
attorney distills and explains the issues and argues inferences that
should be drawn from the testimony as a whole. "[Flor the de-
fense, closing argument is the last clear chance to persuade the
trier of fact that there may be reasonable doubt of the defendant's
guilt."' 90 Perjurious testimony obtained through the free narrative
will only handicap defense counsel's honest efforts to muster a pas-
sionate argument in the client's behalf.
VI. THE CANADIAN BAR APPROACH
A better approach was suggested by Professor Lefstein, tracking
the recommendation of the Canadian Bar Association in its Code
of Professional Conduct.'" ' The rule is quite simple: as an advo-
cate, counsel must treat the tribunal with respect and courtesy and
represent the client resolutely, honorably, and lawfully.19 2 How-
185. Whether a jury is able to identify perjury may turn on a host of variables: How
defense counsel has used peremptory challenges; whether the defendant's credibility was
impeached; if any jurors have seen prior service; and whether the personal beliefs of the
judge are apparent to the jury. Id. at 852.
186. Appel & McGrane, Nix v. Whiteside: Client Perjury and the Criminal Justice Sys-
tem: The State's Position, 23 AM. CRM. L. REv. 19, 35 (1985).
187. Id.
188. Comment, supra note 175, at 567.
189. 422 U.S. 853 (1975).
190. Id. at 862.
191. Lefstein, supra note 6, at 688.
192. CANADIAN BAR ASS'N CODE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, ch. VIII (1974).
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ever, "[a]dmissions made by the accused to his lawyer may impose
strict limitations on the conduct of the defense, and the accused
should be made aware of this."'' 9 Professor Lefstein suggests that
defense counsel make the following explanation to his client con-
cerning the scope of the attorney-client privilege:
Anything you tell me is privileged. That is, I cannot reveal what
you tell me to anyone, including the judge. However, I can reveal
information about a crime you are planning to commit, including
the crime of perjury. Thus, if you were planning to lie on the wit-
ness stand in your forthcoming trial, I could reveal this fact to the
court. Now, of course, I am not assuming that you are planning to
do this, but I did think that, in fairness, I ought to explain to you
how the attorney-client privilege works.19 4
Attorneys and commentators who equate this admonition with a
Miranda warning miss the point.195 To mount an aggressive and
effective defense, counsel must demand complete candor. Counsel
must hear the entire truth and inform clients of potential conse-
quences for deliberate falsehoods before a tribunal. Clients should
recognize that there are limits to the attorney-client privilege. 196
Professor Lefstein indicates, however, that such a warning would
not be construed as encouragement to the client to dissemble, con-
ceal information, or lie. A client who is intent on committing per-
jury probably will not be diverted by counsel's admonition, and it
is doubtful that a truthful client would be induced to be
dishonest.19 7
Standard 4-7.7 limits the attorney-client privilege in ways that
work to deceive rather than support the client. As the Arizona
Court of Appeals noted in State v. Lee, g'" trial counsel doubted
that he had advised appellant "that if the [perjured alibi] wit-
nesses were called, counsel would be unable to give closing argu-
ment. Thus, any argument of waiver is negated by appellant's lack
193. Id., Commentary 9 (emphasis added).
194. Lefstein, supra note 6, at 688.
195. Monroe Freedman has been quoted as saying "'[i]t's very difficult to establish rap-
port' with indigent criminal defendants 'and you don't do it by walking in and giving a
Miranda warning.'" Adler, The Ethics of Perjury, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1985, at 76, 80. Joseph L.
Rauh, Jr., Freedman's own defense counsel during a 1966 bar investigation into Freedman's
ethical positions, responded "I cannot accept the basic concept that a lawyer should try to
deceive the court." Id.
196. Lefstein, supra note 6, at 688.
197. Id.
198. 689 P.2d 170 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983), vacated, 689 P.2d 153 (Ariz. 1984).
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of full warning as to the consequences of calling the witnesses."1 99
Under the Standard, defense counsel is obliged to try to withdraw,
and in meeting this obligation, by word or deed, will thus reveal
the client's perjurious intent to the court. That the client may feel
betrayed is understandable. If withdrawal is successful, substituted
counsel may hear the same proposed testimony from a now sophis-
ticated client who will perhaps be more adroit in concealing the
falseness.20 0
The better approach is for defense counsel to demonstrate can-
dor at the beginning of the attorney-client relationship. "The cli-
ent who is adamant about presenting perjury will know the rules at
the outset and, if he desires to be dishonest, his dishonesty pre-
sumably will be practiced on the first lawyer, thereby avoiding the
difficulties incident to withdrawal. ' 20 1 If counsel becomes aware of
any proposed perjury, his revelation to the court will come as no
surprise to the client.
Use of the Canadian Bar approach in lieu of Standard 4-7.7 also
might alleviate some of the public's mistrust of the legal profes-
sion. The free narrative seems to further the "tribal ethic" held by
most attorneys of protecting oneself and one's group from threats
from outsiders, in this case by suffering perjury in silence.2 0 2 It is
unlikely that attorneys would welcome a jury instruction detailing
the scope of the free narrative, because "once forewarned, any ju-
ror with even minimal sense would then have to be quite suspi-
cious about every other possible form of deception on the part of
lawyers. '20 3 Therefore, attempts to conceal the client's misconduct
and defense counsel's participation in the misconduct must give
way to more candor and openness with the potentially perjurious
client. Adoption of the Canadian Bar approach would be a reason-
able first step.
VII. CONCLUSION
Sanborn v. State represents the law in the Third District unless
and until it is changed by a later en banc decision or by the Su-
preme Court of Florida.2 4 The problem of the perjurious client is
199. Id. at 173 n.3.
200. Lefstein, supra note 6, at 689-690.
201. Id. at 690.
202. S. BOK, supra note 56, at 148-49, 159.
203. Id. at 163 (emphasis in original).
204. Rubin v. State, 490 So. 2d 1001, 1004 n.3 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986), cert. denied, No.
69,048 (Fla. filed Dec. 19, 1986).
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one that will not disappear. In light of the experience of other ju-
risdictions and the decision of the Supreme Court in Nix v. White-
side, the next court to examine the issue should reassess and dis-
card use of the free narrative in Florida's judicial system.

